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Abstract: 
We investigate the performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules using five 
macroeconomic models that reflect a wide range of views on aggregate dynamics. We 
identify the key characteristics of rules that are robust to model uncertainty: such rules 
respond to the one-year-ahead inflation forecast and to the current output gap and incorporate 
a substantial degree of policy inertia. In contrast, rules with longer forecast horizons are less 
robust and are prone to generating indeterminacy. Finally, we identify a robust benchmark 
rule that performs very well in all five models over a wide range of policy preferences. 
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A number of industrialized countries have adopted explicit inﬂation forecast targeting regimes, in
which the stance of policy is adjusted to ensure that the inﬂation rate is projected to return to target
over a speciﬁed horizon.1 Such a regime has also received formal consideration recently by the Bank
of Japan, while Svensson (1999) and others have recommended that the Federal Reserve and the
European Central Bank should follow suit.2 In principle, forecast-based policies can incorporate
comprehensive and up-to-date macroeconomic information and can account for transmission lags
and other structural features of the economy. Furthermore, simple forecast-based policy rules
may serve as useful benchmarks that facilitate public communication regarding monetary policy
objectives and procedures.3
In analyzing forecast-based policies, researchers have generally proceeded by determining rules
that yield optimal or near-optimal stabilization performance in a speciﬁc macroeconometric model.4
However, given substantial uncertainty about the “true” structure of the economy (cf. McCallum
(1988), Taylor (1999b)), it is essential to identify the characteristics of policy rules that perform
well across a reasonably wide range of models; that is, to identify rules that are robust to model
uncertainty.5 This approach seems particularly important in analyzing forecast-based rules, since
the performance of these rules is contingent on the accuracy of the forecasting model.
Thus, in this paper we investigate the performance and robustness of forecast-based rules using
four structural macroeconometric models that have been estimated using postwar U.S. data, along
with a small stylized model derived from microeconomic foundations with calibrated parameter
values. All ﬁve models incorporate the assumptions of rational expectations, short-run nominal
inertia, and long-run monetary neutrality. Nevertheless, these models exhibit substantial diﬀerences
1Leiderman and Svensson, eds (1995), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen
(1999) provide extensive background on and analysis of inﬂation targeting regimes in Australia, Canada, Israel, New
Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Explicit inﬂation targeting has also been adopted by a substantial
number of emerging market countries; see Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000).
2In particular, Svensson (1999), Goodhart (2000), and Svensson and Woodford (1999) recommend that central
banks commit to an inﬂation forecast-targeting rule.
3Clarida and Gertler (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), Orphanides (2001), and Chinn and Dooley (1997)
have found that estimated forecast-based reaction functions provide reasonably accurate descriptions of interest rate
behavior in Germany, Japan, and the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, adopting an explicit
forecast-based rule as a policy benchmark might primarily involve a change in the communication of policy and not
necessarily a major shift in policy actions.
4Such research has been performed at the Reserve Bank of Australia (de Brouwer and Ellis (1998)), the Bank of
Canada (Black, Macklem and Rose (1997a); Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1999)), the Bank of England (Haldane,
ed (1995), Batini and Haldane (1999); Batini and Nelson (2001)), and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Black,
Cassino, Drew, Hansen, Hunt, Rose and Scott (1997b)). Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) analyzed the performance
of instrument and targeting rules in a small adaptive-expectations model of the U.S. economy.
5Monetary policy under model uncertainty has previously been analyzed by Karakitsos and Rustem (1984), Becker,
Dwolatsky, Karakitsos and Rustem (1986), Frankel and Rockett (1988), Holtham and Hughes-Hallett (1992), and
Christodoulakis, Kemball-Cook and Levine (1993). Most recently, Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) evaluated
the robustness to model uncertainty of optimized simple policy rules involving current and lagged macroeconomic
variables, while Taylor (1999a) summarizes the performance of ﬁve rules in an even wider range of macroeconomic
models.
1in price and output dynamics, reﬂecting ongoing theoretical and empirical controversies as well as
diﬀerences in the degree of aggregation, estimation method, sample period, etc.
We assume that the policymaker makes a permanent commitment to follow a time-invariant
rule, and that the policymaker’s objective is to minimize a weighted sum of the unconditional
variances of the inﬂation rate and the output gap, subject to an upper bound on nominal interest
rate volatility.6 We focus on simple instrument rules, in which the short-term nominal interest rate
is adjusted in response to current or projected future values of the inﬂation rate and the output
gap as well as to the lagged nominal interest rate. We begin by determining the conditions on
the policy rule parameters (including the choice of forecast horizon) that are required to ensure a
unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium in each model. Next we determine the optimal
forecast horizons and other policy parameters that minimize the policymaker’s loss function in
each model, and we analyze the robustness of each optimized rule by evaluating its performance
in each of the other models. Having identiﬁed a particular class of robust policy rules, we then
determine the policy parameters that minimize the average loss function across all ﬁve models;
from a Bayesian perspective, this approach corresponds to the case in which the policymaker has
ﬂat prior beliefs about the extent to which each model provides an accurate description of the true
economy.
Our analysis concludes by identifying a speciﬁc forecast-based policy rule that can serve as a
robust benchmark for monetary policy; this rule performs remarkably well for a wide range of policy
preferences as well as for a wide range of prior beliefs about the dynamic properties of the economy.
More generally, our results provide support for policy rules that respond to a short-horizon forecast
(no more than one year ahead) of a smoothed measure of inﬂation, that incorporate a substantial
response to the current output gap, and that involve a relatively high degree of policy inertia
(also referred to as “interest rate smoothing”).7 We ﬁnd that well-designed rules are highly robust
to model uncertainty, particularly in contrast with the lack of robustness of rules that involve
longer-horizon inﬂation forecasts or that omit an explicit response to the output gap.
Finally, it should be noted that our approach of evaluating the robustness of monetary policy
rules to model uncertainty is complementary to Bayesian methods that analyze the policy impli-
cations of uncertainty about the parameters of a particular model, as well as to robust control
methods that indicate how to minimize the “worst-case” losses due to perturbations from a given
model.8 Unlike these other approaches, however, our method naturally lends itself to situations in
6For recent analysis of the monetary policy implications of time-inconsistency and commitment vs. discretion, see
S¨ oderlind (1999), Woodford (1999), Svensson and Woodford (2000), Svensson (2001), and Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om
(2002).
7For analysis of interest rate smoothing in outcome-based rules, see Goodfriend (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), Williams (1999), Levin et al. (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000), Woodford (1999), and Woodford (2000b).
8Optimal policy under parameter uncertainty was investigated in the seminal paper of Brainard (1967) and was
extended by the work of Kendrick (1982) and others; recent examples include Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and
Wieland (2000). Applications of robust control methods include von zur Muehlen (1982), Hansen and Sargent
2which non-nested models represent competing perspectives regarding the dynamic structure of the
economy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the key issues regarding
the speciﬁcation of forecast-based policy rules. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the dynamic
properties of the ﬁve macroeconomic models. In Section 4, we analyze the restrictions on forecast-
based rules that are required to ensure a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Section 5
evaluates the speciﬁcation and performance of forecast-based rules that are optimized for each
individual model. Section 6 considers the extent to which these optimized rules are robust to
model uncertainty and identiﬁes the characteristics of robust policy rules. In Section 7, we ﬁnd
the policy parameters that minimize the average loss function across all ﬁve models, and then we
identify a speciﬁc forecast-based rule that can serve as a benchmark for policy analysis. Section 8
summarizes our conclusions and considers directions for further research.
2 Speciﬁcation of Forecast-based Policy Rules
In this section, we consider the choices involved in specifying a forecast-based monetary policy rule,
in light of the theoretical arguments for these rules as well as the characteristics of various rules
that have been considered in the literature.
One intuitively appealing argument for forecast-based rules is that monetary policy acts with a
non-trivial lag, and hence current policy actions should be determined in light of the macroeconomic
conditions that are expected to prevail when such actions will have a substantial eﬀect. (This
rationale is referred to as “lag encompassing” by Batini and Haldane (1999).) Of course, since
any forecast can be expressed in terms of current and lagged state variables, a forecast-based rule
cannnot yield any improvement in macroeconomic stability relative to the fully optimal policy rule
(which incorporates all of the relevant state variables). However, a simple forecast-based policy
rule might perform substantially better than a simple outcome-based rule (that is, a rule involving
only a small set of current and lagged variables). For example, consider a sharp hike in import oil
prices that gradually passes through to prices of domestically-produced output: an outcome-based
policy rule reacts only as the inﬂationary eﬀects are realized, whereas a forecast-based rule can
respond immediately to the shock and hence get a head start on restraining its inﬂationary eﬀects.
A related argument (referred to as “information encompassing” by Batini and Haldane (1999)) is
that forecast-based policy rules can implicitly incorporate a wide variety of information regarding
the current state of the economy as well as anticipated future developments. For example, a
forecast-based rule can automatically adjust the stance of monetary policy depending on whether a
given macroeconomic disturbance is expected to persist or to vanish quickly. In contrast, a simple
outcome-based rule prescribes a ﬁxed policy response to a given movement in the inﬂation rate,
(1997), Onatski and Stock (1999), Giannoni (2000), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000).
3regardless of whether the underlying shock is transitory or persistent. In principle, a forecast-
based rule can incorporate an even wider array of information, because the forecast itself can
embed judgmental adjustments that reﬂect idiosyncratic events beyond the scope of any particular
macroeconometric model.
Finally, it has been argued that monetary policy can eﬀectively stabilize both inﬂation and
output through a rule that only involves inﬂation forecasts, with no explicit response to the output
gap. (Batini and Haldane (1999) refer to this feature of forecast-based rules as “output encom-
passing.”) In principle, the forecast horizon of the rule can be adjusted to reﬂect the policymaker’s
preferences for stabilizing output vs. inﬂation in response to aggregate supply shocks; that is, with
a longer inﬂation forecast horizon, the policy rule brings inﬂation back to target more gradually
and thereby dampens the associated swings in output and employment.
In light of these considerations, it is helpful to review the characteristics of forecast-based rules
that have been used in policy analysis at central banks as well as rules that have been studied by
academic researchers. Ten such rules are characterized in Table 1. Rules A and B were ﬁtted to
U.S. data from the past two decades, while the remaining rules were determined based on their
stabilization performance in speciﬁc macroeconometric models.9 Five of these rules were obtained
by analysts at the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, and the Reserve Bank of Australia. As
noted by Amano et al. (1999), rule I provides a good approximation to the reference rule used
in the Bank of Canada’s Quarterly Projection Model, a reference rule that has served as a rough
benchmark but not the sole determinant of Canadian monetary policy.
Most of the rules in Table 1 can be expressed using the following general formulation:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)(r∗ + Et˜ πt+θ)+α(Et˜ πt+θ − π∗)+βEtyt+κ, (1)
where i denotes the short-term nominal interest rate, ˜ π denotes the four-quarter average inﬂation
rate, y denotes the output gap (the deviation of output from potential), r∗ denotes the unconditional
mean of the short-term real interest rate, and π∗ denotes the inﬂation target; all of these variables
are measured at annual rates in percentage points.10 The operator Et indicates the forecast of a
particular variable, using information available in period t. The integers θ and κ denote the forecast
horizons (measured in quarters) for inﬂation and the output gap, respectively.
Evidently, several important choices must be made in specifying a forecast-based rule. For
example, the ﬁrst ﬁve rules in Table 1 utilize a relatively short inﬂation forecast horizon (2-4
quarters), while the remaining rules use substantially longer horizons (8-15 quarters). (In all cases,
the inﬂation forecast horizon equals or exceeds the output forecast horizon.) Seven of the ten rules
9The parameters of rules C, D, E, I, and J were selected using models with rational expectations, while the
parameters of rules F, G, and H were chosen based on performance in models with adaptive expectations.
10Levin, Wieland and Williams (2001) provide extensive results regarding the performance of rules involving the
one-quarter annualized inﬂation rate instead of the four-quarter average inﬂation rate.
4Table 1: Characteristics of Forecast-Based Rules from the Literature
General Speciﬁcation
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)(r∗ + Et˜ πt+θ)+α(Et˜ πt+θ − π∗)+βEtyt+κ
Label Source θκ ρ α β
Inﬂation Forecast Horizon ≤ 1y e a r
A Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999a) 4 0 .84 .27 .09
B Orphanides (2001) 4 4 .56 .27 .36
C de Brouwer and Ellis (1998) 4 4 0 2.80 1.00
D Batini and Nelson (2001) 2 - .98 1.26 -
E Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999) 3-4 - 0 1.50 -
Inﬂation Forecast Horizon ≥ 2y e a r
F Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) 8 - .62 1.97 -
G Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) 12 - .71 3.57 -
H Batini and Nelson (2001) 15 - .85 34.85 -
I Amano et al. (1999) it = ib
t +3 .0(Et˜ πt+8 − π∗)
J Batini and Haldane (1999) it = Etπt+1 + .5r∗ + .5(it−1 − Et−1πt)
+.5(Etπt+8 − π∗)
Notes: Rules D, F, G, H, and J utilize the annualized one-quarter inﬂation rate (π) instead of
the four-quarter average inﬂation rate (˜ π). In rule E, the ﬁrst inﬂation forecast (multiplied by
the coeﬃcient 1−ρ) uses a four-quarter horizon, while the second inﬂation forecast (multiplied by
the coeﬃcient α) uses a three-quarter horizon. The ﬁnal two rules do not conform to the general
speciﬁcation: rule I involves the long-term nominal interest rate ib
t, while rule J involves the lagged
value of the ex ante real interest rate, it−1 − Et−1πt.
reﬂect the “output encompassing” hypothesis described above and hence omit any explicit response
to the output gap. Finally, a majority of the rules exhibit “interest rate smoothing” or “policy
inertia”; that is, these rules involve a direct response to the lagged short-term interest rate.
Our subsequent analysis will consider the stabilization properties of rules of the form given in
equation (1); these rules fall into the class of forecast-based instrument rules, in which the short-
term nominal interest rate responds directly to a model-consistent forecast of the inﬂation rate
and may also respond to the output gap and lagged interest rate. Nevertheless, as emphasized by
Svensson (2001), such rules may be particularly susceptible to time-inconsistency problems. Thus,
in future research it will be useful to analyze the robustness of forecast-based targeting rules, in
which the policy instrument is determined by the ﬁrst-order conditions of an explicit optimization
5of the central bank’s objective function (cf. Svensson (1997), Svensson and Woodford (1999)).11
3 The Five Models
In evaluating the performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules, we consider ﬁve diﬀerent
models of the U.S. economy. The ﬁrst model is small and highly stylized; as in Bernanke and
Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999b) and Woodford (2000a), this model consists of
two equations derived from the behavior of optimizing agents:
πt = δEtπt+1 + φyt +  t, (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1 − r∗
t). (3)
The price-setting equation (2) can be viewed as determining aggregate supply, while aggregate
demand is determined by the “expectational IS curve” in equation (3) combined with a particular
interest rate rule. Thus, in the subsequent discussion we refer to this model as the “optimizing
AD-AS” model.12
While each of the four macroeconometric models has been ﬁtted to U.S. data, the dynamic
properties of these models exhibit marked diﬀerences that reﬂect ongoing theoretical and empirical
controversies. In particular, the Fuhrer-Moore (FM) model exhibits the highest degree of inertia
with respect to both aggregate demand and inﬂation (cf. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). In the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) model, prices and spending are subject to higher-order adjustment costs;
this model also features a relatively detailed representation of the supply side of the economy
(cf. Brayton, Mauskopf, Reifschneider, Tinsley and Williams (1997b), Reifschneider, Tetlow and
Williams (1999)). In the multicountry model of Taylor (1993) – hereafter referred to as TMCM –
prices are determined by staggered wage contracts, while consumption and investment expenditures
are explicitly forward-looking and exhibit relatively little intrinsic inertia. Finally, the Monetary
Studies Research (MSR) model developed by Orphanides and Wieland (1998) exhibits output
dynamics similar to that of TMCM and inﬂation dynamics similar to that of the FM model.
To compare the properties of these models, we utilize an estimated federal funds rate equation
as a benchmark policy rule. In particular, using U.S. quarterly data for the period 1980:1-1998:4,
11Note that in models with adaptive expectations, an alternative approach is to formulate policy in terms of an
inﬂation forecast that is constructed using an unchanged nominal interest rate (cf. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999),
Jansson and Vredin (2001)); however, researchers have varying opinions about how to implement and interpret this
approach in models with rational expectations.
12In calibrating the model, we use the parameter values given in Woodford (2000a), simply adjusting these values to
account for the fact that our variables are expressed at annual rates. Thus, we set δ =0 .99, σ =1 .59, and φ =0 .096,
while r
∗
t follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation parameter 0.35, and the innovation is i.i.d. with a standard
deviation of 3.72. We assume that the aggregate supply disturbance  t is i.i.d. and calibrate its standard deviation so
that the unconditional variance of inﬂation under the benchmark estimated policy rule matches the sample variance
of U.S. quarterly inﬂation over the period 1983:1-1999:4.
6Figure 1: Unconditional Autocorrelations in the Four Macroeconometric Models
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Note: The dotted lines indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent conﬁdence interval
for the sample autocorrelogram of each series (not shown), estimated over the period 1983-2000.
we estimated the following equation via two-stage least squares:
it = − .28
(.31)
+ .76
(.06)
it−1 + .60
(.11)
˜ πt + .21
(.25)
yt + .97
(.23)
∆yt. (4)
The standard error of each regression coeﬃcient is given in parentheses. 13 Using this benchmark
policy rule, we compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution of each model and
then analyze its unconditional second moments and other dynamic properties.14
A measure of the degree of intrinsic persistence of the four macroeconometric models is provided
by Figure 1, which shows the unconditional autocorrelations of inﬂation and the output gap.15
Given that each macroeconometric model has been ﬁtted to essentially the same data (apart from
diﬀerences in sample period), it is not surprising that the implied autocorrelograms of all four
models fall almost entirely within the empirical 95 percent conﬁdence bands. Nevertheless, the fact
that the correlograms of all four models are largely consistent with the data is really a reﬂection of
the degree of sampling uncertainty: inﬂation is highly persistent in the FM and MSR models and
13In estimating this equation, we used the quarterly average federal funds rate, the CBO output gap series, and the
inﬂation rate of the chain-weighted GDP price deﬂator. It should be noted that the rule also includes an economically
and statistically signiﬁcant response to the change in the output gap.
14The solution is obtained using the Anderson and Moore (1985) implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
method, modiﬁed to take advantage of sparse matrix functions.
15Autocorrelations provide a reasonable measure of intrinsic persistence for these four models because nearly all
the shocks used for computing unconditional moments are serially uncorrelated; the only exceptions are the term
premium shocks for certain ﬁnancial variables in FRB and TMCM.
7Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Policy Rule Innovations
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far less so in the FRB and TMCM models, and the output gap is also much more persistent in the
FM model than in the other three macroeconometric models.
The monetary transmission lags also diﬀer substantially across the four macroeconometric mod-
els. Figure 2 shows the response of output and inﬂation in each model to a 100 basis point innovation
to the benchmark policy rule. The peak output response occurs with a lag of one to four quarters,
while the peak inﬂation response exhibits a lag of three to nine quarters. For comparison, it is
interesting to note that estimated VAR models of the U.S. economy exhibit a monetary transmis-
sion lag of about two years for output and a lag of about three years for inﬂation (cf. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams (1997a)).
4 Conditions for Determinacy
In analyzing the performance of forecast-based rules, we focus on the set of rules that yield a unique
stationary rational expectations equilibrium in each model. If a rule fails to ensure determinacy,
then the economy may follow a number of diﬀerent equilibrium paths involving macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations that are unrelated to economic fundamentals; thus, such rules may be viewed as in-
herently undesirable.16 Nevertheless, we recognize that the existence of multiple equilibria may be
sensitive to the assumption of rational expectations and that indeterminacy may not occur under
alternative types of expectations formation (e.g., least-squares learning).17
16For recent analysis of this issue, see Kerr and King (1996), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Christiano and Gust
(1999), Clarida et al. (1999a), and Woodford (2000a).
17See McCallum (1999), McCallum (2000), and McCallum (2001a).
8For the small stylized model, determinacy conditions can be obtained analytically for policy rules
involving the one-step-ahead inﬂation forecast; cf. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Woodford
(2000a). In particular, determinacy not only places a lower bound on the value of α (a fairly
standard condition for determinacy of policy rules in a wide range of macroeconomic models), but
also imposes an upper bound on this coeﬃcient. With a moderate policy response to expected
inﬂation, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium; that is, any other values of the current
output gap and current inﬂation rate are associated with an explosive path in subsequent periods.
In contrast, with a suﬃciently aggressive policy response to expected inﬂation, the output gap
and inﬂation rate are projected to converge back to the steady state regardless of their values in
the current period. Thus, at any given point in time, the output gap and the inﬂation rate can
suddenly move in response to random shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals (often
referred to as “sunspots”). Finally, these analytic conditions reveal that the link between expected
and actual inﬂation is strengthened by an explicit response to the current output gap and/or the
lagged nominal interest rate, and hence such rules are noticeably less susceptible to indeterminacy.
With longer forecast horizons or more complicated structural dynamics, analytical descriptions
of the requirements for determinacy are not easily obtained. Therefore we now proceed to compute
these conditions numerically for each of the ﬁve macroeconomic models. These results indicate
that the issue of indeterminacy is relevant not only in small “stylized” models but also in macroe-
conometric models that exhibit a higher degree of inﬂation and output persistence. In fact, only
the FM model is relatively immune to indeterminacy problems: due to its high degree of intrinsic
persistence, this model exhibits very strong links between the current inﬂation rate and its expected
value at horizons of up to four years.18 In contrast, the determinacy conditions for the FRB, MSR,
and TMCM models are qualitatively similar to those of the small stylized model; quantitatively,
these conditions depend on the speciﬁc output and price dynamics of each model.
Figure 3 shows the indeterminacy boundaries for forecast-based rules that do not respond
directly to the output gap. For each speciﬁcation of the inﬂation forecast horizon, the corresponding
curve indicates the boundary of the indeterminacy region; that is, multiple equilibria occur for
all combinations of the parameters α and ρ that lie to the northwest of the speciﬁed boundary.
Evidently, the indeterminacy region expands with the length of the inﬂation forecast horizon and
shrinks with the degree of interest rate smoothing. For example, an inﬂation forecast horizon of 16
quarters generates multiple equilibria for virtually all combinations of 0 <α≤ 10 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.5.
For rules involving a four-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon, determinacy occurs in the MSR and
TMCM models for all combinations of α and ρ shown in the ﬁgure; in the FRB model, ρ>0.75 is
suﬃcient to ensure determinacy for all 0 <α≤ 10.19
18Even with a forecast horizon of 16 quarters and no explicit response to the output gap, all combinations of
0 <α≤ 10 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.5 are consistent with a unique rational expectations equilibrium in the FM model.
19Although not shown in Figures 3 and 4, indeterminacy arises in each of the macroeconometric models if α is very
9Figure 3: Cross-Model Comparison of Indeterminacy Regions: β =0
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Note: For each speciﬁcation of the inﬂation forecast horizon (4, 8, 12, and 16 quarters), multiple
equilibria occur for all combinations of the parameters α and ρ that lie to the northwest of the
corresponding curve. If no curve is shown for a particular forecast horizon, then that speciﬁcation
yields determinacy for all combinations of 0 ≤ α ≤ 10 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.5.
Allowing for a moderate response to the current output gap shrinks the region of indeterminacy
in each macroeconometric model. Figure 4 shows the indeterminacy boundaries for rules with a
unit coeﬃcient on the current output gap (that is, β =1 ) . 20 With this output response, rules
with a four-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon yield a unique equilibrium in every model for every
combination of 0 <α≤ 8a n d0≤ ρ ≤ 1.5.
Our analysis highlights several key characteristics of rules that yield a unique equilibrium in ev-
close to zero, especially with long forecast horizons; this lower bound is typically on the order of 0.1.
20We have explored these indeterminacy regions for other values of β and obtained qualitatively similar results.
10Figure 4: Cross-Model Comparison of Indeterminacy Regions: β =1
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Note: See Figure 3.
ery model, namely, a relatively short inﬂation forecast horizon, a moderate degree of responsiveness
to the inﬂation forecast, an explicit response to the current output gap, and a substantial degree of
policy inertia. In light of these results, it is interesting to check the determinacy properties of the
rules taken from the literature, whose characteristics were discussed in Section 2. Table 2 indicates
whether each rule generates multiple equilibria (“ME”) or determinacy (“–”) in each of the ﬁve
macroeconomic models.
Only rules A and D yield determinacy in every model. Rule A possesses all the characteristics
supportive of determinacy, including the use of a four-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon, a positive
output gap response, and a substantial degree of policy inertia. While rule D does not respond
explicitly to the output gap, this rule uses a short inﬂation forecast horizon (only two quarters)
11Table 2: Determinacy of Rules from the Literature
Rule Model
AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
A– – – – –
BM E – – – –
CM E – – – –
D– – – – –
EM E – M E – –
F ME – ME ME –
G ME – ME ME –
HM E M E M E M E M E
I ME – ME ME ME
JM E – M E – –
Notes: “ME” signiﬁes that the rule yields multiple equilibria in the speciﬁed model, while “–”
indicates that the rule yields a unique stationary equilibrium.
and a high degree of policy inertia. Rules E through J generate multiple equilibria in at least
two models; it is notable that none of these rules includes an explicit response to the output gap.
Furthermore, ﬁve of these six rules have a relatively long inﬂation forecast horizon (at least eight
quarters); the only exception is rule F, which has a shorter forecast horizon but suﬀers from a
complete lack of policy inertia. Finally, rule H is unique in generating indeterminacy in the FM
model (the model with the greatest degree of intrinsic inertia); this rule prescribes an exceptionally
aggressive response to the 15-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecast.
5 Optimized Forecast-Based Rules
In this section, we investigate the characteristics of optimized forecast-based rules. For a given
model and a speciﬁc form of the policy rule, we determine the inﬂation and output gap forecast
horizons and coeﬃcients that minimize a weighted average of inﬂation variability and output gap
variability, subject to an upper bound on interest rate variability. Henceforth we shall restrict
our attention to rules that yield a unique rational expectations equilibrium in the speciﬁed model.
However, this restriction is almost never binding, in the sense that the optimal rules we consider
are well away from the regions of indeterminacy shown in the previous section. (In the few cases
where the constraint is binding, we will make note of that fact.)
125.1 The Optimization Problem
We assume that the policymaker’s loss function L has the form
L = Va r(π)+λV ar(y), (5)
where Va r(.) denotes the unconditional variance and the weight λ ≥ 0 indicates the policymaker’s
preference for reducing output variability relative to inﬂation variability. This form of loss function
has been used in many previous analyses (e.g., Taylor (1979)), and can be derived using the same
microeconomic foundations as those used to obtain the optimizing AD-AS model (cf. Woodford
(2000a)).21 King (1997) refers to a policymaker who places no weight on output stability (λ =0 )
as an “inﬂation nutter.” In models with microeconomic foundations, the magnitude of the implied
value of λ is very sensitive to the particular speciﬁcation of overlapping nominal contracts: random-
duration “Calvo-style” contracts imply that λ ≈ 0.01 (Woodford (2000a)), whereas ﬁxed-duration
“Taylor-style” contracts imply that λ ≈ 1 (Erceg and Levin (2001)). Since the appropriate value
of λ remains controversial, we will consider four diﬀerent values, namely, 0,1/3,1,and3.
For a given value of λ and a particular functional form of the policy rule, the parameters of
the rule are chosen to minimize the loss function L subject to an upper bound on the volatility of
changes in the short-term nominal interest rate; that is, the unconditional standard deviation of
∆it cannot exceed a speciﬁed value σ∆i.
Henceforth we consider linear policy rules of the general form given by equation (1).22 We also
consider the more restricted class of rules that exclude an explicit output gap response (that is,
β ≡ 0). Finally, we refer to outcome-based rules (in which the forecast horizons θ = κ = 0) as the
class of OB rules.
All ﬁve models considered in this paper exhibit a tradeoﬀ between inﬂation-output variability
and interest rate variability, except at very high levels of interest rate variability.23 Figure 5 illus-
trates this tradeoﬀ for the four macroeconometric models for three values of the policy preference
parameter λ. In particular, for each model, we consider the set of OB rules of the form given by
equation (1) for which the coeﬃcients ρ, α,a n dβ are chosen optimally given that the forecast
21The social welfare function involves additional terms if the model involves overlapping wage contracts (Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000)) or habit persistence in consumption (Fuhrer (2000), Amato and Laubach (2001)).
22Given the assumption of a quadratic objective function and the linear structure of each model, the restriction
to linear rules is innocuous and greatly facilitates computation. More generally, non-quadratic preferences or model
nonlinearities give rise to nonlinear optimal policy rules. For example, explicit inﬂation-targeting regimes typically
are implemented with respect to a target zone rather than a speciﬁc target point, implying a nonlinear policy response
(Orphanides and Wieland (2000b), Tetlow (2000)). Furthermore, the presence of the non-negativity constraint on
nominal interest rates directly imposes a nonlinearity to the policy rule (Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Orphanides and
Wieland (2000a), Wolman (1998), Reifschneider and Williams (2000)). In the present paper, we do not investigate
the extent to which nonlinear policy rules are sensitive to model uncertainty, but rather leave this issue for future
research.
23This tradeoﬀ is characteristic of many macroeconomic models in the recent literature; cf. the papers in Taylor,
ed (1999), and further discussion in Sack and Wieland (2000).
13Figure 5: The Tradeoﬀ between Interest Rate Variability and Macroeconomic Stabilization
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Note: The vertical dash-dot line indicates the value of σ∆i generated by the benchmark rule A.
horizons θ = κ = 0. For a speciﬁc value of λ, each point on the corresponding curve indicates the
minimized value of the loss function L for a particular value of σ∆i. The vertical line in each panel
indicates the standard deviation of interest rate changes associated with the estimated benchmark
rule given in equation (4); this interest rate volatility varies noticeably across the four models,
mainly due to the use of a diﬀerent sample period in estimating the parameters and the innovation
covariance matrix of each model.
From Figure 5 it is evident that stabilization performance deteriorates rapidly if interest rate
volatility is constrained to be much lower than that induced by the benchmark rule (which was
estimated over the period 1980-1998). On the other hand, stabilization performance cannot be
substantially improved even if interest rate volatility is permitted to be much higher than that
induced by rule A (unless the policymaker places implausibly high weight on output volatility).24
24We also note that a linear policy rule which induces highly variable nominal interest rates may not be im-
plementable in practice, because such a rule will prescribe frequent (and occasionally large) violations of the non-
14Therefore, we focus our attention on policy rules for which the parameters are chosen to minimize
the loss function L subject to the constraint that interest rate volatility cannot exceed that of the
estimated benchmark rule. The shadow value of this constraint, ∂logL/∂σ∆I, is very small in all
ﬁve models. For example, the shadow value in the AD-AS model (in percentage points) is 0.3, 0.3,
0.6, and 1.1 for λ =0 ,1 /3, 1, and 3, respectively. For the four macroeconometric models, the
shadow value never exceeds 0.4 for this range of values of λ.
5.2 Characteristics of Optimized Rules
We now analyze the optimal choices of forecast horizons and policy rule coeﬃcients for each model
for a range of values of the preference parameter λ. In particular, we consider a relatively large
grid of possible combinations of inﬂation and output forecast horizons. For each point on this grid,
we compute the values of the policy rule coeﬃcients that minimize the loss function L subject to
the speciﬁed upper bound on interest rate volatility. Finally, we compare the resulting values of
L across the forecast horizon grid to determine the optimal combination of inﬂation and output
forecast horizons. We only consider forecast horizons up to 20 quarters for both the inﬂation rate
and the output gap; however, this constraint binds only in one case noted below.
For each model and each value of λ, Table 3 indicates the optimal forecast horizons for the
inﬂation rate and output gap (θ and κ, respectively) and the optimal values of the three coeﬃcients
(ρ, α,a n dβ). For example, most of these rules involve a very high degree of interest rate smoothing,
roughly similar to that of the optimized outcome-based rules obtained by Levin et al. (1999) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).25 This table also indicates the percent change in the loss function
– denoted %∆L – generated by the forecast-based rule relative to that of the optimized OB rule.
Note that %∆L is always non-positive, because the class of OB rules (for which θ = κ =0 )i s
nested within the class of forecast-based rules.
For all ﬁve models, the optimal forecast horizons are generally very short, and never exceed
four quarters. Furthermore, it is evident that forecast-based rules never yield dramatic improve-
ments in stabilization performance relative to simple outcome-based rules. The reduction in the
policymaker’s loss function is less than 20 percent in all cases, and does not exceed 5 percent for
every value of λ in three of the models (FM, MSR, and TMCM). Furthermore, while not shown in
the table, we have conﬁrmed that these results are not sensitive to the choice of inﬂation measure
(four-quarter average vs. one-quarter annualized rate) or to the particular value of the upper bound
on interest rate variability.26
negativity constraint on the federal funds rate (cf. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). In principle, we could analyze
nonlinear rules that incorporate this non-negativity constraint (see Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Reifschneider
and Williams (2000), and Wolman (1998)), but doing so would substantially increase the computational costs of our
analysis.
25Woodford (1999) refers to rules with ρ>1 as “super-inertial.”
26We have repeated the analysis described above using an upper bound σ∆i that is twice as large as the value
15Table 3: Characteristics and Performance of Optimized Rules
Model λθ κ ρα β %∆L
0 0 1 .78 16.55 -.64 -20
Opt. 1/3 0 0 1.57 7.27 6.12 0
AD-AS 1 0 0 1.55 3.04 6.23 0
3 0 0 1.55 1.49 6.26 0
0 1 0 .96 .51 .10 0
1/3 0 4 .97 .86 .68 -1
FM 1 0 4 1.00 .67 .98 -1
3 0 4 1.02 .43 1.12 -1
0 4 1 1.28 5.47 .02 -10
1/3 0 2 1.16 1.63 1.46 -5
FRB 1 0 2 1.19 1.21 1.97 -7
3 0 2 1.19 .74 2.16 -9
0 0 0 .96 4.14 .02 0
1/3 0 1 1.25 2.91 1.92 -3
MSR 1 0 1 1.22 1.71 2.01 -3
3 0 1 1.19 .99 2.03 -1
0 2 0 1.04 3.59 .11 -4
1/3 2 0 .97 1.33 1.28 0
TMCM 1 1 1 1.31 1.52 4.93 0
3 1 1 1.33 .85 5.10 -1
Notes: For each model and each value of the preference parameter λ, this table indicates the
optimal forecast horizons for inﬂation and the output gap (θ and κ, respectively) and the optimal
coeﬃcient values (ρ, α,a n dβ). The table also indicates the percent change in the policymaker’s
loss function (%∆L) generated by the rule relative to the optimized outcome-based rule.
Evidently, some of the purported advantages of forecast-based rules (such as “lag encompassing”
and “information encompassing”) are quantitatively unimportant, even in rational expectations
models with substantial transmission lags and complex dynamic properties. These results are
consistent with those of Levin et al. (1999), who found that fairly complicated outcome-based rules
(which respond to a large number of observable state variables) yield only small stabilization gains
over simple outcome-based rules. It is also interesting to note that Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
found similar results in a small macroeconometric model with adaptive expectations: although
associated with the estimated benchmark rule. Relaxing this constraint yields small improvements in stabilization
performance, but the relative performance of forecast-based to outcome-based policy rules does not change signiﬁ-
cantly.
16the Rudebusch-Svensson model includes a dozen state variables, the current output gap and four-
quarter average inﬂation rate essentially serve as suﬃcient statistics for monetary policy, and hence
forecast-based rules provide minimal stabilization gains even in that model.27
Table 4: Rules With No Explicit Output Gap Response
Model λθ ρ α %∆L
0 0 1.57 51.46 0
Opt. 1/3 2 -0.42 8.80 734
AD-AS 1 2 -0.42 8.90 2721
3 2 -0.47 8.34 3216
0 9 1.21 2.55 1
1/3 18 1.28 20.29 2
FM 1 18 .77 4.60 11
3 20 .62 3.47 30
0 4 1.27 5.45 -10
1/3 7 .96 7.41 167
FRB 1 8 .94 8.70 407
3 8 .93 8.47 793
0 0 .95 3.90 0
1/3 5 -.06 3.11 117
MSR 1 4 -.38 1.79 195
3 4 -.52 1.14 295
0 3 1.14 4.92 -4
1/3 3 .73 3.41 24
TMCM 1 3 .58 3.02 55
3 6 .50 7.91 87
Notes: For each model and each value of the preference parameter λ, this table indicates the
optimal inﬂation forecast horizon (θ) and optimal coeﬃcient values (ρ and α) for rules without
an explicit response to the output gap (that is, β ≡ 0). The table also indicates the percent
change in the policymaker’s loss function (%∆L) generated by the rule relative to the optimized
outcome-based rule.
Finally, we consider optimized rules that do not respond explicitly to the output gap (that is,
β ≡ 0); the characteristics and stabilization performance of these rules are indicated in Table 4.
Evidently, the optimal inﬂation forecast horizon is considerably longer than for rules with an
unconstrained output gap response. For example, with λ = 1, the optimal inﬂation forecast horizon
27Of course, such model-based evaluations do not reﬂect the potential beneﬁts of responding to an inﬂation forecast
that incorporates additional information via add factors and judgmental adjustments.
17is 8 quarters for the FRB model and 18 quarters for the FM model.28
As noted in Section 2, some authors have argued that a rule which responds exclusively to the
inﬂation forecast (with a suitable choice of forecast horizon) can be eﬀective at stabilizing both
output and inﬂation, even without an explicit response to the output gap. However, our results
indicate that excluding the output gap from the policy rule may cause a severe deterioration
in stabilization performance, at least when the policymaker places non-trivial weight on output
stability. For example, when λ =1 /3, these rules generate excess losses (compared with OB rules)
of over 100 percent in the FRB and MSR models and over 700 percent in the optimizing AD-AS
model. Thus, “output encompassing” is not a general characteristic of inﬂation forecast rules.29
6 Robustness of Optimized Rules under Model Uncertainty
Now we analyze the extent to which optimized forecast-based rules are robust to model uncertainty.
We continue to assume that the central bank maintains a permanent commitment to a speciﬁc policy
rule with parameters that are optimized based on one of the ﬁve models. However, we now assume
that the true economy is described by a diﬀerent model; that is, the model used for choosing the
policy rule is misspeciﬁed.
In the context of forecast-based policies, we need to make a further assumption regarding how
expectations are formed in implementing the policy rule. First, we consider the “model consistent”
case in which the policymaker’s forecasts are based on the true model; that is, the forecasts are
unbiased and eﬃcient. Next, we consider the “model inconsistent” case in which the forecasts are
constructed from the same misspeciﬁed model that has been used for determining the parameters
of the policy rule. In the ﬁrst case, macroeconomic performance suﬀers because of the suboptimal
choice of policy rule parameters; in the second case, systematic forecast errors are added to the
problem. While we could consider other variants on model-inconsistent forecasts (such as generating
forecasts from a VAR model), we believe that such variants would not substantially change the
results reported here.
Our basic method for evaluating robustness is the same for both cases of forecast generation. For
a given value of the policy preference parameter λ, we take a given rule X that has been optimized
for a speciﬁc model – referred to as the “rule-generating” model – and we simulate rule X in a
diﬀerent model – referred to as the “true economy” model. If rule X generates a unique rational
28As noted above, we restricted our search to forecast horizons up to 20 quarters; this bound is only reached in
one case, namely, the inﬂation forecast horizon for the FM model when λ =3 .
29Our analysis assumes that the output gap is known in real time, whereas in practice the output gap may be
subject to persistent measurement errors (cf. Orphanides, Porter, Reifschneider, Tetlow and Finan (2000), McCallum
(2001b)). Still, the existence of output gap mismeasurement does not imply that policy should completely exclude a
response to the output gap. In a linear-quadratic framework with symmetric information, the optimal response to the
eﬃcent output gap estimate is invariant to the degree of mismeasurement (cf. Svensson and Woodford (2000)). For
simple outcome-based rules, output gap mismeasurement does imply some attenuation – but not complete elimination
– of the output gap response (Smets (1999), Swanson (2000), Orphanides (2001)).
18expectations equilibrium, then we compute its loss function L (using the speciﬁed value of λ). Now
we evaluate the robustness of rule X by comparing its performance with the appropriate outcome-
based (OB) policy frontier of the true economy model. Thus, we ﬁnd the OB policy rule Y that has
been optimized for the true economy model subject to the constraint that its interest rate volatility
(σ∆i) cannot exceed that implied by rule X. Finally, we compute %∆L, the percent deviation of the
loss function value of rule X from that of rule Y, that is, %∆L measures the relative distance of the
loss function of rule X from the relevant OB policy frontier in Figure 5. It should be noted that this
measure of robustness involves the unconditional variances of output and inﬂation, corresponding to
our assumption that the central bank maintains a permanent commitment to a speciﬁc policy rule.
In practice, of course, a central bank can modify its policy strategy if it observes poor stabilization
outcomes or acquires other information about the structure of the economy; however, incorporating
such a learning process would dramatically increase the complexity and computational intensity of
the analysis.
6.1 Robustness with Model-Consistent Forecasts
In this subsection, we assume that the policy rule is optimized using a misspeciﬁed model and is
implemented using model-consistent forecasts of inﬂation and output; that is, these forecasts are
formulated using the true model of the economy with the actual policy rule in operation. This
exercise might be motivated as follows. Suppose that a policymaker develops a forecast-based
rule that is optimal in the particular modeling framework that the policymaker prefers to use for
this purpose; unfortunately, this model is an imperfect representation of the true economy. The
policymaker decides to use the optimized rule to implement monetary policy and communicates
this intention to the central bank staﬀ. In implementing the policy rule, the policymaker is willing
to use forecasts that are generated using the staﬀ’s macroeconometric model; coincidentally, this
model happens to be the correct representation of the true economy. In the following section we
consider the case in which the central bank staﬀ generates its forecasts using the same (misspeciﬁed)
model that the policymaker used in choosing the policy rule.30
The results of this exercise are reported in the ﬁve panels of Table 5, each of which indicates the
degree of robustness of rules that have been optimized for the speciﬁed model and policy parameter.
(Recall that the forecast horizons and coeﬃcients of these rules may be found in Table 3 above.)
In most cases, the optimized rule taken from any particular model is not robust across the other
four models. For example, taking the rule optimized for the AD-AS model with λ =1 /3 yields a
relative loss of 174 percent in the FM model, while the corresponding rule optimized for FM yields
30We do not analyze the performance of rules involving forecasts based on an exogenous or unchanged path for
the nominal interest rate; such an approach has been studied by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). While constant-
interest-rate forecasts can serve to highlight the risks associated with policy inaction, such forecasts ignore relevant
information on the central bank’s systematic future policy response and are particularly problematic in rational
expectations models, in which permanently ﬁxed nominal interest rates generate indeterminacy.
19Table 5: Robustness of Optimized Rules with Model-Consistent Forecasts
Optimized for AD-AS Optimized for FM
λ FM FRB MSR TMCM AD-AS FRB MSR TMCM
0 9 198 1 2 81 7 40 0
1/3 174 33 5 14 831 5 27 12
1 262 40 17 15 ME 9 41 11
3 496 72 33 37 ME 16 57 9
Optimized for FRB Optimized for MSR
λ AD-AS FM MSR TMCM AD-AS FM FRB TMCM
0 202 65 16 -2 10 20 5 4
1/3 85 6 2 2 81 27 0 5
1 106 9 5 0 102 29 -4 3
3 120 14 9 -1 118 38 -4 0
Optimized for TMCM
λ AD-AS FM FRB MSR
06 8 1 5 - 3 1 3
1/3 10 22 17 20
1M E 4 2 4 1 9
3M E 4 9 - 1 4
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the optimized rule is taken from the speciﬁed
“rule-generating” model, and then this rule is evaluated in each alternative “true economy” model
using model-consistent forecasts. The notation “ME” indicates that the rule yields multiple equilib-
ria; otherwise, the entry indicates the percent deviation of the loss function from the outcome-based
policy frontier of the true economy model (%∆L).
a relative loss of 831 percent in the AD-AS model. Based on these results, a prudent policymaker
would be reluctant to rely solely on any rule obtained from the analysis of a single model.
Fortunately, Table 5 does suggest that ﬁnding a robust rule is not an impossible task. In
particular, the rule optimized for TMCM with λ =1 /3 yields excellent performance in each of
the other models, with relative losses of less than 25 percent. From Table 3, we see that this
rule involves a relatively short inﬂation forecast horizon (θ = 2), as well as a substantial interest
rate smoothing (ρ near unity) and a non-trivial response to the current output gap – exactly the
characteristics of robust rules that were identiﬁed in Section 4.
In contrast, although not shown here, forecast-based rules with no explicit output gap response
(that is, β ≡ 0) are subject to potentially disastrous performance in the face of model uncertainty,
especially when the policymaker places non-trivial weight on output stability.31 As we saw in
Table 4, these rules not only omit an explicit output gap response but also typically involve a
31These results are reported in Levin et al. (2001).
20Table 6: Implications of Model-Inconsistent Forecasts
Optimized for FM Optimized for MSR
λ FRB MSR TMCM FRB TMCM
01 4 3 95 4-
Model-inconsistent 1/3 6 14 9 3 14
forecasts 1 14 19 15 11 32
3 2 5 2 52 2 2 14 5
0 7 40 -0 5 4
Model-consistent 1/3 5 27 12 -0 5
forecasts 1 9 41 11 -4 3
36 5 7 9 - 4 0
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the optimized rule is taken from the speciﬁed
“rule-generating” model (either FM or MSR), and then this rule is evaluated in each alternative
“true economy” model. In the upper panel, the rule is implemented using forecasts obtained from
the rule-generating model; in the lower panel, the rule is implemented using forecasts obtained
from the true economy model (as in Table 5). Each entry indicates the percent deviation of the
loss function from the outcome-based policy frontier of the true economy model (%∆L).
low degree of interest rate smoothing and a highly aggressive response to a relatively long-horizon
inﬂation forecast. And as noted above, rules with these characteristics are typically not very robust
to model uncertainty.
6.2 Robustness with Model-Inconsistent Forecasts
Now we investigate the consequences of using model-inconsistent forecasts; that is, we assume that
the policy rule is optimized using a misspeciﬁed model and that the rule is then implemented using
forecasts generated by the same misspeciﬁed model. After determining the optimized policy rule
for a particular model, we obtain the reduced-form representations of the relevant inﬂation and
output gap forecasts in terms of the state variables of the model, and we add these reduced-form
forecast equations to the model of the true economy. The policy rule is expressed in terms of
the misspeciﬁed forecasts, which are obtained by evaluating these reduced-form forecast equations
using the data generated by the true economy model. Thus, this procedure presumes that the
state variables from the policymaker’s model also appear in the true economy model; that is, the
misspeciﬁed model is nested within the true economy model. For this reason, we consider cases
in which the FM model constitutes the policymaker’s model while one of the other three models
represents the true economy, and we also consider cases in which the MSR model constitutes the
policymaker’s model while either FRB or TMCM represents the true economy.
The results of this exercise are reported in the upper part of Table 6. As in the preceding
subsection, we evaluate the relative performance (%∆L) of each policy rule compared with the
21optimized outcome-based rule that generates the same level of interest rate volatility in the true
economy model. Comparing these results regarding the robustness of forecast-based rules with the
outcomes presented in Table 5 (repeated in the lower part of Table 6), we ﬁnd that in most cases
performance deteriorates when the model-inconsistent forecast is used, especially in the case of
rules optimized in the MSR model and evaluated in the FRB or TMCM models. However, there
are exceptions to this pattern, for example in the case of rules optimized in the FM model and
evaluated in the MSR model. Overall the magnitude of the diﬀerence in loss compared to the
optimized OB rule is not very large and never exceeds 50 percent.
6.3 Rules with Fixed Forecast Horizons
We have seen that optimized rules involve relatively short forecast horizons (0-4 quarters) and are
remarkably robust to model uncertainty. Now we consider the degree of robustness of rules with
longer forecast horizons. In particular, we analyze the performance of rules in which the inﬂation
forecast horizon is ﬁxed at either one or two years (that is, θ = 4 or 8), and that respond either to
the current output gap or to its one-year-ahead forecast (that is, κ = 0 or 4). For a given value of
λ and a given combination of the output and inﬂation forecast horizons, we determine the optimal
coeﬃcients (ρ, α,a n dβ) for each model, and then proceed to evaluate its performance in each of
the other models, following the methodology described above.
For brevity, we focus on the robustness of rules obtained from each of the four macroecono-
metric models and implemented in the optimizing AD-AS model using model-consistent forecasts;
additional robustness results may be found in Levin et al. (2001). The coeﬃcients of the optimized
rules are reported in Table 7, while Table 8 indicates the relative loss of each rule (%∆L) compared
with the OB policy frontier of the AD-AS model.32
Forecast-based rules that respond to a four-quarter inﬂation forecast and the current output
gap are generally quite robust to model uncertainty, especially when the policymaker places non-
negligible weight on stabilizing output as well as inﬂation (λ>0). In contrast, optimized rules with
an eight-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon or a four-quarter output gap forecast are markedly less
robust, including a much greater incidence of multiple equilibria. This lack of robustness primarily
reﬂects the substantial diﬀerences in output and inﬂation dynamics across the various models.
7 Identifying a Robust Benchmark Rule
Our previous analysis has highlighted the general characteristics of forecast-based rules that are
robust to model uncertainty; in this section, we proceed to identify a speciﬁc rule that can serve
32In the MSR and TMCM models, the optimized rules obtained for θ = κ = 4 lie right on the edge of the
indeterminacy region. For the set of rules that yield a unique stationary equilibrium, the optimum is obtained by
rules that generate less interest rate variability than the estimated benchmark rule; this is the only case in our analysis
for which the interest rate variability constraint is not binding.
22Table 7: Coeﬃcients of Optimized Rules with Fixed Forecast Horizons
Model λθ =4 ,κ=0 θ =8 ,κ=0 θ =4 ,κ=4
ρα β ρα β ραβ
0 .88 .65 -.00 1.19 2.05 -.04 1.03 .78 .11
1/3 .94 .54 .32 1.07 .58 .46 1.00 .85 .49
FM 1 .85 .39 .50 .84 .61 .50 1.02 .73 .90
3 .82 .21 .64 .82 .32 .60 1.04 .48 1.13
0 1.27 5.31 .04 2.50 49.22 -.05 1.28 5.53 .02
1/3 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.13 .96 2.12 8.65 6.79
FRB 1 1.03 .54 1.10 1.03 .61 1.08 2.22 5.97 8.84
3 1.03 .30 1.13 1.03 .33 1.12 2.11 3.38 8.69
0 .95 8.39 -.33 .97 18.96 .65 1.00 4.16 -.35
1/3 1.11 2.21 1.38 1.12 3.85 1.44 1.80 28.00 24.00
MSR 1 1.08 1.20 1.42 1.09 1.81 1.47 1.80 16.00 24.00
3 1.05 .65 1.41 1.06 .89 1.44 1.80 8.00 24.00
0 1.74 14.77 .30 1.27 12.90 2.17 1.82 17.11 .26
1/3 1.02 1.92 1.39 1.04 6.22 1.73 1.06 13.53 10.21
TMCM 1 .97 .80 1.47 .96 .04 1.53 1.00 7.87 9.74
3 .95 .42 1.49 .95 .04 1.53 1.23 6.12 12.00
as a robust benchmark for monetary policy. None of the rules taken from the literature (listed in
Table 1) is satisfactory for this purpose: most of those rules generate indeterminacy in one or more
of the ﬁve models (see Table 2), while the remaining rules perform quite poorly relative to the
outcome-based policy frontier.33 Therefore, for each value of the preference parameter λ,w en o w
determine the policy rule that minimizes the average loss function across all ﬁve models, subject
to an upper bound on the level of interest rate volatility in each model.
In particular, we assume that the policymaker’s loss function L is given by:
L =
1
5
(LOPT + LFM + LFRB + LMSR + LTMCM), (6)
where Li is the value of the loss function (5) obtained by evaluating a particular policy rule in
model i. Thus, from a Bayesian perspective, L corresponds to the expected loss function when the
policymaker has ﬂat prior beliefs regarding which of these ﬁve models is the correct representation
of the economy.
33The performance of these rules is reported in Levin et al. (2001).
23Table 8: Robustness of Fixed-Horizon Rules in the Optimizing AD-AS Model
Forecast
Horizons Rule-Generating Model
θκ λ FM FRB MSR TMCM
4 0 0 210 191 ME 216
1/3 26 13 10 12
13 41 0 8 1 3
33 81 11 0 1 6
80 0 M E M E M E M E
1/3 10 12 9 ME
13 1 9 7 1 1
32 51 1 9 1 4
4 4 0 194 204 ME 221
1/3 ME ME ME ME
1M EM EM E M E
3M EM EM E M E
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ and each choice of the inﬂation forecast
horizon θ and output gap forecast horizon κ, the coeﬃcients of the rule are optimized using the
speciﬁed “rule-generating” model (as shown in the previous table), and then this rule is evaluated
in the optimizing AD-AS model using model-consistent forecasts. Each entry indicates the percent
deviation of the loss function from the outcome-based policy frontier of the optimizing AD-AS
model (%∆L); the notation “ME” indicates that the rule yields multiple equilibria.
In light of our earlier results, we focus exclusively on the class of rules that respond to the
one-year-ahead forecast of the smoothed inﬂation rate and to the current output gap (that is, rules
with θ = 4 and κ = 0). Thus, for a given value of λ, we ﬁnd the values of the policy parameters
(α, β,a n dρ) that minimize L, subject to the constraint that in every model the unconditional
standard deviation of ∆it cannot exceed the value generated by the estimated benchmark rule. The
results of this optimization are reported in Table 9.
For a policymaker who is concerned solely with stabilizing inﬂation (λ = 0), the optimized rule
works very well in several of the macroeconometric models but performs poorly in the optimizing
AD-AS model. In this case, it is apparent that no four-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecast-based rule
provides near-optimal performance in every model.34 Thus, the rule given in Table 9 is the optimal
choice for a policymaker with ﬂat priors concerning the relative accuracy of the ﬁve models; this
rule would also be near-optimal for any policymaker who has reasonable conﬁdence in the four
macroeconometric models and is relatively skeptical about the accuracy of the optimizing AD-
AS model. In contrast, this rule would be far from optimal for a policymaker who discounts the
relevance of the four macroeconometric models and who has strong prior beliefs that the optimizing
34In contrast, an outcome-based rule can be obtained that performs very well for λ = 0 in all ﬁve models.
24Table 9: Minimizing the Average Loss Across All Five Models
Optimal Parameters Stabilization Performance (%∆L)
λρ α β Opt. AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
0 1.02 0.66 0.08 139 1 0 42 1
1/3 0.97 0.45 0.41 19 9 9 15 1
1 0.92 0.30 0.53 23 7 14 15 1
3 0.89 0.19 0.60 29 4 22 18 4
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the corresponding row of this table indicates
the parameters and stabilization performance of the optimized rule (with ﬁxed forecast horizons
θ = 4 and κ = 0) that minimizes the average loss function L across all ﬁve models, subject to
the constraint that in every model the unconditional standard deviation of ∆it cannot exceed the
value generated by the estimated benchmark rule. The stabilization performance in each model is
measured by the percent deviation of the loss function from the OB policy frontier of that model
(%∆L).
AD-AS model is the best representation of the true economy.
For a policymaker who is concerned with stabilizing both inﬂation and the output gap (λ>0),
we ﬁnd that each optimized rule performs remarkably well in all ﬁve models, especially considering
the dramatically diﬀerent dynamic properties of these models. For example, when λ =1 /3, Table 9
indicates that the loss function value generated by the optimized rule never deviates more than
20 percent from the outcome-based policy frontier of each model. Evidently, choosing the policy
parameters to minimize the average loss function across the ﬁve models does not generate large
stabilization costs relative to ﬁne-tuning these parameters to a given model. Thus, the same rule
would be nearly optimal even for a policymaker with very diﬀerent (non-ﬂat) prior beliefs about
the accuracy of the ﬁve models.
It is also striking that the policy rule parameters in Table 9 are quite similar for all three non-
zero values of λ. This suggests the possibility of identifying a benchmark rule that performs well
for a fairly wide range of policy preferences as well as for a wide range of prior beliefs about the
dynamic properties of the economy.
Therefore, we now consider the following simple forecast-based policy rule, which has parameter
values nearly identical to those of the optimized rule for λ =1 /3:
it =1 .0it−1 +0 .4(πt+4 − π∗)+0 .4yt. (7)
Table 10 indicates the stabilization performance of this rule for each value of the preference param-
eter λ. As one would expect, the rule performs very well in all ﬁve models when λ =1 /3. This rule
also performs remarkably well when λ = 1; as in the previous case, the loss function never deviates
more than 20 percent from the outcome-based policy frontier. The rule provides reasonably robust
25Table 10: Stabilization Performance of the Benchmark Forecast-Based Rule
λ Opt. AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
0 278 76 57 379 13
1/3 16 12 7 16 1
11 9 7 2 0 6 0
32 2 2 3 4 8 1 2 0
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the corresponding row of this table indicates
the percent deviation of the loss function obtained by the benchmark forecast-based rule (given in
equation (7) from the OB policy frontier of each model (%∆L).
performance even for λ = 3, although the maximum value of %∆L does reach nearly 50 percent in
this case. Based on these results, we conclude that this rule can serve as a robust benchmark for
monetary policy, at least for policymakers who place non-trivial weight on stabilizing the output
gap as well as the inﬂation rate.35
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the performance and robustness of forecast-based monetary pol-
icy rules using ﬁve models that reﬂect divergent views about the dynamic properties of the U.S.
economy. Our analysis yields the following conclusions:
• While forecast-based rules can serve as a useful framework for monetary policy, this class
of rules does not provide substantial gains in stabilization performance compared with simple
outcome-based rules.
• Robust policy rules respond to a short-horizon forecast (not exceeding one year) of a smoothed
measure of inﬂation, incorporate an explicit response to the current output gap, and involve a
relatively high degree of policy inertia.
• We have identiﬁed a speciﬁc forecast-based rule that can serve as a robust benchmark for
monetary policy; this rule performs remarkably well in all ﬁve models for a wide range of policy
preferences.
Our analysis also suggests several fruitful areas for future research. First, while this paper
has focused exclusively on models with rational expectations and short-run nominal inertia, our
methodology can be applied to an even broader set of models that incorporate alternative assump-
tions about expectations formation and about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
35It should be noted that one can also obtain an outcome-based rule that yields robust performance for λ ≥ 1/3i n
all ﬁve models.
26Second, our analysis has focused exclusively on models of the U.S. economy; in future work, it will
be interesting to follow a similar approach in identifying robust policy rules for other economies with
diﬀerent structural characteristics (e.g., small open economies and emerging market economies).
Third, we have proceeded under the assumption that the parameters of each competing model
are known exactly and that the data series are measured precisely; for example, we have assumed
that the output gap is known in real time, whereas in practice the output gap may be subject to
persistent measurement errors. Thus, additional research will be required to identify rules that are
robust to data uncertainty and to parameter uncertainty as well as to model uncertainty. Finally,
our analysis has assumed that the central bank maintains a permanent commitment to a particular
monetary policy rule; in future research, it will be interesting to consider the problem of designing
robust policies for an environment in which the central bank can make ongoing policy adjustments
as it accumulates additional information about the underlying structure of the economy.
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